28 U.S.C. § 1782: Recent Insights from the Eleventh Circuit and the Southern District of Florida

By: Alejandro Rodriguez Vanzetti

28 U.S.C. § 1782, commonly referred to as “Section 1782,” is perhaps the most powerful evidence-gathering tool available to foreign litigants. The statute allows interested persons to request judicial assistance from U.S. federal courts to obtain evidence for use in a pending or contemplated proceeding. In the Eleventh Circuit, the process is distilled into four statutory requirements and four discretionary factors: The former a product of 150 years of congressional efforts to provide a mechanism for evidence-gathering for use in foreign tribunals; the latter established by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2004 landmark decision, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.[1] If a federal district court finds that a Section 1782 application meets the statutory requirements, and if the Intel factors favor the applicant, it may, in its discretion, grant the Application, opening the door to the broad-ranging discovery made possible by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Any litigant wanting to use Section 1782 must be able to show the court that the evidence is “for use” in a foreign or international tribunal and that the discovery target resides or can be found in the district where the application is filed. This article highlights recent developments regarding these two statutory factors, as analyzed by courts in the Eleventh Circuit.

“Resides or is Found” In the District: Statutory Factor Clarified by the Eleventh Circuit

The person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district of the district court ruling on the application for assistance. Courts have taken different approaches to finding this requirement is satisfied. Such is the result of, primarily, the nature of the subpoena target’s contacts with the district, but also whether the target is a person or a corporation. Generally, courts analyze the target’s contacts with this district or state, in some cases applying state law to both standards. For example, Florida district courts have relied on Florida’s long arm statute to determine whether a subpoena target is “found in” this district, and they have relied on Florida’s domicile/permanent residency standard for elections in interpreting the “resides in” prong.[2] Factual inquiries regarding the discovery target’s contacts with the district are routine, considering, for example, whether the target managed Florida businesses, held Florida telephone numbers, owned bank accounts in the state, paid real estate taxes, and conducted financial transactions.[3]

In the Southern District of Florida—one of the busiest courts in the country for Section 1782 proceedings—few cases have addressed how the principles of personal jurisdiction apply to the “resides or is found” in Section 1782 factor. Of the courts that have addressed it, some courts have identified an overlap to the extent of the so-called tag jurisdiction but noted that “the relationship between § 1782 and the contours of personal jurisdiction are not the same.”[4] Others have found the factor to be equivalent to being “found” in the jurisdiction for purposes of personal jurisdiction.[5]

The Eleventh Circuit clarified this issue in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine in March of 2025, finding that parties may rely on principles of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process to satisfy this statutory factor.[6] In that case, Applicant Devine (who sought to transfer the proceeding to the Southern District of New York) argued that the Florida district court lacked jurisdiction because the subpoena target, Spears (a law firm physically located in New York) neither resided nor could be found in the district. Spears’s contacts with the Middle District of Florida comprised of providing years of legal services, including depositions and document productions, as part of a case pending in the district.

The Devine court turned to the Second Circuit’s analysis of the “resides or is found” in factor in In re del Valle Ruiz, which established that the statutory language “extends to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.”[7] The Divine court then drew a parallel between another factually analogous case—where it had found the court had personal jurisdiction over a Michigan attorney who provided years of estate-planning counsel to a Florida resident[8]—with Devine, where New York attorneys provided years of substantive legal services, including taking depositions and producing documents, as part of a RICO action in the Middle District of Florida. The Eleventh Circuit determined that Spears’s contacts with the district were such that exercise of jurisdiction under Section 1782 comports with due process. Spears was thus “found” in this district for purposes of Section 1782. Also in line with Valle Ruiz, the court found that contacts with the district are sufficient when they are “the primary or proximate reason that the evidence sought is available at all,” reflecting the standard for specific personal jurisdiction.[9]

At least one court in the Southern District of Florida, In re Application of Spear Limited, has since found that Devine adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Valle Ruiz, bridging the gap between personal jurisdiction and the “found in” statutory factor and clarifying the standard for future application.[10]

Courts Refuse to Impose Limitations on Use of Section 1782 Discovery

Discovery sought in a Section 1782 Application must be “for use” in a foreign or international tribunal. But did Congress intend to limit the later use of evidence in a separate action? Ten years ago, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Glock v. Glock, Inc.[11] that it did not. In 2025, two decisions issued in the Southern District of Florida reaffirmed that neither the statutory nor discretionary factors of Section 1782 apply to the use of discovery after a petition has been granted: In re Application of Dailane Investments Ltd. & Michael Maillis[12] and In re Application of BAPA Holdings, Corp.[13]

Glock is widely cited for the contention that “nothing in the language of § 1782 . . . purports to limit later uses of evidence that have been properly obtained” under the statute.[14] The Circuit Court in Glock reasoned that the protective order at issue did not bar the use of Section 1782 evidence in subsequent U.S. civil litigation, since its language allowed the appellant to use discovery in any proceeding to which she is a party. In effect, the protective order authorized the appellant the right to use the evidence obtained by means of the Section 1782 application “in any litigation anywhere in the world. . . .”[15] The only hurdle the appellant needed to scale under the protective order was obtaining leave of court to do so, which she did.

Dailane addressed this very issue in the context of a case where a U.S proceeding was initiated instead of the contemplated foreign proceeding that served as the basis for the original Section 1782 application. Dailane Investments’s application sought discovery from Respondent H.I.G. Capital, LLC and some of its officers for use in a contemplated proceeding in Luxembourg against an HIG subsidiary. Respondents did not object to the application and agreed to produce the information subject to a confidentiality agreement that contemplated the use of the evidence in the foreign proceeding to be filed in Luxembourg or in a yet-to-be discovered cause of action in Florida.

Late into the document production, the evidence revealed liability on the part of respondents who supplied the discovery. Some months later, Dailane Investments drafted a complaint and, consistent with the confidentiality agreement, moved for authorization to use respondents’ production in a Florida-based action. Respondents objected to the proposed domestic use of the evidence, arguing that the Section 1782 application “was merely a ruse to obtain discovery before filing litigation in this Court because [applicants] ha[d] not yet filed a foreign proceeding in Luxembourg. . . .”[16] Because Respondents did not have any evidence to substantiate their allegations of bad faith, they also asked the Court for reciprocal discovery, specifically, attorney-client communications which they supposed would show a long-term plan to file in the United States.

In granting the motion to authorize the use of discovery in the Florida lawsuit, the magistrate judge relied on the principles of Glock and confirmed that the only limits on the use of materials obtained pursuant to Section 1782 are those imposed by the court in the order granting the application or a subsequent protective order; the original question of the contemplated Luxembourg proceeding thus became irrelevant. To require Dailane Investments to “rediscover” documents in a second lawsuit would be “a waste of judicial economy and run afoul of clear statutory language and precedent.”[17]

In upholding the denial of Respondents’ cross-motion, the district court rejected Respondents’ argument that Glock required that Respondents be given an opportunity to support their assertion that a “ruse” existed. It held that the court does not have “any affirmative duty to permit a fishing expedition for evidence that may or may not exist of that chicanery” and cited Glock for the contention that “when no evidence of deception exists, as [the magistrate judge] specifically found here, ‘nothing prevents’ the parties from negotiating a protective or confidentiality order, which is exactly what they have done here.”[18]

In re Application of BAPA Holdings, Corp., which was decided weeks before Dailane, also rejected implied limitations on the scope of the use of Section 1782 discovery. There, Applicant BAPA Holdings requested documents from Respondent Broadspan for use in a pending Guatemalan civil proceeding against BAM. The court granted the application and the parties filed a Joint Confidentiality and Protective Order, which limited the use of Confidential Information to the pending civil action, the Section 1782 action, and “any other legal action against BAM in Guatemala related to the Foreign Proceeding.”[19] BAPA later sought to use the documents in a contemplated Guatemalan criminal proceeding, noting the Protective Order’s reference to any other legal action against BAM in Guatemala language is inclusive of criminal proceedings in the country. Broadspan disagreed. BAPA therefore sought clarification (or an amendment of the Protective Order) from the district court.

Broadspan argued the criminal proceeding was too speculative and that the proposed use of evidence exceeded the scope of the Protective Order because the criminal action would be brought against both BAM and its corporate representative. In finding in favor of Applicant BAPA, the court noted that Broadspan “misconstrues the posture of BAPA’s Motion” as “Broadspan attempts to apply the restrictions on obtaining § 1782 to potential uses of § 1782 discovery already obtained.”[20] Citing Glock, it found that “the only limitation on the use of § 1782 material after an application for § 1782 discovery is any protective order imposed by the district court.”[21] And upon analyzing the Protective Order, the court found that it permits the use of the discovery materials even where defendants other than BAM are parties to the case.

These cases demonstrate the ever-evolving nature of Section 1782, a valuable tool for foreign litigants seeking access to U.S.-style discovery. Guided by the Eleventh Circuit, Florida district courts have relied on principles of due process to satisfy the “resides or is found” in statutory factor and have permitted the broad use of properly obtained Section 1782 discovery.

* Sequor Law served as counsel for applicants in In re Application of Spear Limited, In re Application of Dailane Investments Ltd. & Michael Maillis, and In re Application of BAPA Holdings, Corp. *

Alejandro Rodriguez Vanzetti is an attorney at Sequor Law, where he focuses his practice on asset recovery, international judgment enforcement, international arbitration and litigation, and financial fraud. Alejandro frequently represents individuals and companies in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, including In re Application of Exchange Union Company, In re Asociación Mutual Para Profesionales de la Fuerza e Infantes de Marina (ASOMUFFAA), and In re Zawawi. His work in this area intersects with asset tracing, freeze orders, and enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts. Alejandro serves on the Board of the South Florida Chapter of the Federal Bar Association. Before joining Sequor Law, Alejandro served as a Judicial Law Clerk to U.S. Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid and intern to U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Prior to law school, he worked at an international law firm in Miami, where he played a key role in large-scale litigation and government enforcement defense matters as well as developing the firm’s Litigation Assistant Program across its 14 global offices.

Endnotes

[1] Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).

[2] In re Terra Invest, LLC, No. 21-cv-23332, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 516, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022) (referencing Florida’s domicile/permanent residency standard for elections to interpret the “resides in” prong); In re Application of MTS Bank, No. 17-mc-21545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115851, at *10–13 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2017) (analyzing Fla. Stat. § 48.193, pursuant to the Florida long arm statute, with regard to the “found in” prong).

[3] Courts consider these and similar factors in deciding whether a target can be found in this district for purposes of § 1782. See In re Compensacion, No. 20-mc-25212, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110944, at *14 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. Deposito Centralizado de Compensacion y Liquidacion de Valores Decevale, S.A. v. Ecuador High Yield Fund, LLC, No. 21-11889, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20185 (11th Cir. July 7, 2021) (noting that the target owned several Florida telephone numbers and managed a proxy of the Florida based subpoenaed entities); In re Application of MTS Bank, No. 17-mc-21545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115851, at *10–13 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2017) (holding that the requirements of § 1782 had been met where the witness owns a Florida telephone number and conducts financial transactions, among other factors); In re Terra Invest, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 516, at *14 (considering that the target did not own a bank account in Florida in finding that the target did not reside in this District).

[4] In re MTS Bank, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115851, at *12.

[5] In re Application of Inversiones y Gasolinera Petroleos Valenzuela, S. de R.L., No. 08-20378-MC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2011) (citing In re Application of Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and Int’l Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Comm. 1, 10 (1998) (“Insofar as the term [“found”] applies to legal rather than natural persons, it may safely be regarded as referring to judicial precedents that equate systematic and continuous local activities with presence.”).

[6] Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine (In re Request of Devine), No. 21-13587, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5631 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).

[7] In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2019).

[8] Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 255–60 (11th Cir. 1996).

[9] Devine, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5631, at *28.

[10] In re Application of Spear Ltd., No. 1:24-mc-24481 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2025), Dkt. No. 26 (Order denying respondents’ motion to vacate; objection overruled Sept. 25, 2025).

[11] Glock v. Glock, Inc., 797 F.3d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 2015).

[12] In re Dailane Invs. Ltd., No. 1:22-cv-23619, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165169 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2025) (objection overruled Aug. 22, 2025).

[13] In re BAPA Holdings, Corp., No. 22-mc-20504-BLOOM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65686 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2025).

[14] Glock, 797 F.3d at 1006.

[15] Id.

[16] In re Dailane Invs. Ltd., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165169, at *13–14.

[17] Id. at *11.

[18] Aug. 21, 2025 Hr’g on Objections Dkt. No. 59, Tr. at 8:18–24.

[19] BAPA Holdings, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65686, at *3.

[20] Id. at 11.

[21] Id.