DON’T TAKE HEAT FOR THAT TWEET: AVOIDING ETHICAL PITFALLS IN THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

JOHN BROWNING

In the 2017 Packingham v. North Carolina case, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed in writing for the majority that: “While we now may be coming to the realization that the cyber age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.” And by now, most lawyers know that practicing in the digital age is rife with ethical minefields. With over 2.3 billion people worldwide on Facebook, a billion tweets processed on Twitter every 48 hours, and over 800 million users Instagramming and Snapchatting away, social media is impossible to ignore.

Changes to Model Rules of Professional Conduct

I have ushered in new expectations of digital competence as attorneys are now held to a higher standard of being conversant in the benefits and risks of technology. Ethics opinions across the country are addressing issues like the limits of advising clients about what to “take down” from their Facebook pages, contact with witnesses via social media, and even researching the online profiles of prospective jurors. By forgetting that posts on Facebook or Twitter are just as subject to ethical prohibitions as are more traditional forms of communication, lawyers nationwide have found themselves facing disciplinary actions.

Take, for example, the 2016 case of a Florida plaintiff’s personal injury lawyer, David Singer, who began a jury trial in a case over whether a passenger had been permanently injured by walking on the hot deck of a Carnival cruise ship, only to have the federal judge presiding over the case hear a motion to disqualify him over his Facebook posts. Carnival’s counsel argued that Singer should be disqualified for “inexcusable” conduct in posting photos and “willfully improper” statements on Facebook to warn passengers of “outrageously high temperatures” on the cruise ship deck. Among other statements on Singer’s Facebook page right before trial were allegations that Carnival “knew that their fake teakwood deck heated up” so as “to burn the feet of a passenger who ended up having all 10 toes and parts of both feet amputated,” as well as admonishments to a defense medical expert that “Doc, your buddies at Carnival knew of the problem because there were nine previous cases of burns on their deck—many of them kids.” Carnival’s lawyers also claimed that Singer had violated court orders by allegedly publishing private information about a mediation in the case. Although Singer apologized to the court, U.S. District Judge Joan Lenard referred the Facebook conduct to a disciplinary committee.1

Lawyers have to understand that civility and professionalism are expected not just in the courtroom, or in traditional avenues of communication, but on social media platforms as well. On many occasions, a lack of civility can put a lawyer at risk of disciplinary action or even criminal charges. In In re Gamble in 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court imposed a six-month suspension on a lawyer for his
“egregious” and “over the top” messages on Facebook to an unrepre-
sented unwed mother while representing the baby’s biological father
during an adoption proceeding. The court felt that the lawyer’s com-
 munications, trying to make the mother feel guilty about consenting
to give the child up, violated both Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to
the justice system) and Rule 8.4(g) (conduct reflecting adversely on
the lawyer’s fitness to practice).

**Ethical Quandaries in Social Networking**

Beyond civility concerns, lawyers need to be aware of how their
use of social media in handling a case can raise ethical issues. This
includes such tasks as case investigation, evidence preservation, and
even jury selection. A number of jurisdictions around the country
have already begun holding attorneys to a higher standard when it
comes to making use of online resources, including demonstrating
due diligence, researching prospective jurors, and even locating and
using exculpatory evidence in criminal cases. As “digital digging” be-
comes the norm, it becomes harder for an attorney to say he or she
has met the standard of competence when the attorney has ignored
social media avenues.

**Case Investigation**

Many of the ethical quandaries that social networking presents for
lawyers arise out of the manner in which attorneys use (or mis-
use) these sites. Consider the practice of using social media sites
to gather information about a party or witness, for example. While
there generally is no ethical prohibition against viewing the publicly
available portion of an individual’s social networking profile, may
an attorney (or someone working for that attorney) try to “friend”
someone in order to gain access to the privacy-restricted portions
of that profile? Ethics opinions from the Philadelphia Bar Association
(March 2009), the New York City Bar (September 2010), the New
York State Bar (September 2010), the Oregon Bar (February 2013),
the New Hampshire Bar (June 2013), and others have made it clear
that the rules of professional conduct against engaging in deceptive
conduct or misrepresentations to third parties extend to cyber-
space. As the New York City Bar ethics opinion emphasizes, with
deception being even easier in the virtual world than in person, this
is an issue of heightened concern.

Not surprisingly, lawyers have found themselves in ethical hot
water for engaging in such “false friending.” In June 2013, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, Assistant Prosecutor Aaron Brockler was fired (and
later suspended by the Ohio Bar) after he posed as a murder defend-
ant’s fictional “baby mama” on Facebook in order to communicate
with two female alibi witnesses for the defense and try to persuade
them not to testify. County Prosecutor Timothy McGinty had to with-
draw his office from the case and hand it over to the Ohio attorney
general, but not before acknowledging that Brockler had “disgraced
this office and everyone who works here” by “creating false evi-
dence” and “lying to witnesses.” Similarly, even though Rule 4.2 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits communicating
with a represented party, lawyers have had to be reminded that this
applies to *all* forms of communication, including via social network-
ing. Two defense attorneys in New Jersey currently face disciplinary
action for allegedly directing their female paralegal to “friend” the
young male plaintiff during the course of a personal injury lawsuit
in order to gain access to information from his privacy-restricted
Facebook profile.

**Evidence Preservation**

In addition to using social networking sites for gathering informa-
tion, the ethical duty to preserve information is another concern in
the age of Facebook and Twitter. While no lawyer wants to discover
embarrassing photos or comments on a client’s Facebook page that
might undermine the case, Model Rule 3.4 prohibits an attorney from
unlawfully altering or destroying evidence or assisting others in doing
so. Clearly, a lawyer’s ethical duty to preserve electronically stored
information encompasses content from social networking sites. Yet
this, too, is a lesson that some lawyers learned the hard way.

For example, in the Virginia wrongful death case of *Allied
Concrete v. Lester* in 2013, the plaintiff’s attorney directed his
paralegal to instruct the client to delete content from his Facebook
page that depicted him as something less than a grieving widower
(the Facebook photos in question depicted the young man in the
company of young women, wearing a shirt that read “I [heart symbol]
Hot Moms”). The attorney also had his client sign sworn interrogato-
ries stating he didn’t have a Facebook account. After a $10.6 million
verdict for the plaintiff, the defense brought a motion for new trial
based on spoliation of evidence. The trial judge cut the damages
award in half (the Virginia Supreme Court later reinstated the full
verdict) and imposed sanctions of $722,000 (most of which were
against the plaintiff’s counsel) for an “extensive pattern of deceptive
and obstructionist conduct.” The attorney, a partner in the largest
plaintiff’s personal injury firm in the state and a past president of the
Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, had his license to practice law
suspended for five years by the Virginia Bar in June 2013.

**Jury Selection**

Another area in which lawyers’ use of social media can raise ethical
questions is jury selection. Should lawyers probe the online selves of
prospective jurors? The Missouri Supreme Court actually imposed
an affirmative duty on lawyers to conduct certain internet back-
ground searches of potential jurors (specifically that juror’s litigation
history) if the lawyer plans to argue juror bias related to his or her
litigation history. Multiple ethics opinions, including an American
Bar Association (ABA) formal opinion, have addressed the issue of
“Facebooking the jury.” In the first of these, the New York County
Lawyer’s Association Committee on Professional Ethics held in
2011 that “passive monitoring of jurors, such as viewing a publicly
available blog or Facebook page” is permissible so long as lawyers
have no direct or indirect contact with jurors during trial. Subse-
quent opinions from the New York City Bar Association (2012) and
the Oregon Bar (2013) agreed with this, while sounding a cautionary
note to lawyers that even accessing a prospective juror’s Twitter
feed or LinkedIn profile could cause the juror to learn of the lawyer’s
viewing or attempted viewing. Such contact, according to both ethics
committees, “might constitute a prohibited communication even if
inadvertent or unintended.” In other words, as with other aspects in
which lawyers might use social media, ignorance or lack of familiarity
will not be an excuse for committing an ethical violation.

In April 2014, the ABA weighed in on this issue with Formal Opin-
ion 406. Like the earlier state ethics opinions, it too concluded that
a lawyer is ethically permitted to review a juror’s social networking
presence, provided that no contact is made with the juror. However,
the ABA opinion diverges from its state counterparts in its consid-
eration of whether auto alerts by sites such as LinkedIn or Twitter
to the juror/user that her profile is being viewed would constitute
impermissible contacts. Formal Opinion 466 doesn’t see this as a problem, stating that “The fact that a juror or potential juror may become aware that a lawyer is reviewing his Internet presence when a network setting notifies the juror of such does not constitute a communication from the lawyer in violation of Rule 3.5(b).” Nationals, the practice of researching prospective jurors online has become so widespread that a number of federal courts are providing attorneys with guidance on how to do so ethically through standing orders and provisions in local rules. For example, U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas issued a standing order on the subject, and both the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York and the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho have addressed it in their local rules.

**Instagram and Your Duty of Candor to the Court**

With more than 800 million active users, Instagram is behind only Facebook and YouTube in popularity. In a typical day, Instagram users “like” over 4.2 billion posts per day and share 95 million posts each day. So even if you can’t claim as many followers as Selena Gomez (over 132 million as of January 2018) or Beyoncé (more than 110 million), there’s still a lot of incentive to use Instagram (a photo-sharing social networking platform that enables users to take pictures, share them, and edit them with filters).

But lawyers have to be careful about what they post as well. In January 2018, a Philadelphia judge punished two lawyers who had represented a plaintiff in a December 2017 trial over the medication Xarelto. The two lawyers, Ned McWilliams of Pensacola, Fl., and Emily Jeffcott of New Orleans, had posted a number of photographs of the courtroom to Instagram with the hashtag “#killinnazis” (a reference to both the Quentin Tarantino movie “Inglorious Basterds” and Germany-based Bayer, the developer of Xarelto). Post-trial motions by the defense had argued that the plaintiff's counsel’s social media posts were intended to create a link in the minds of the jurors between the German pharmaceutical company and Nazi Germany, calling it a “xenophobic” strategy. The court issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and set aside the $27.8 million verdict calling it a “xenophobic” strategy. The court issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and set aside the $27.8 million verdict (on grounds unrelated to the social media posts). It also revoked the pro hac vice admission of McWilliams and sanctioned Jeffcott $2,500 ordered her to perform 25 hours of community service. The judge noted that the Instagram posts in question and the #killinnazis hashtag (which Jeffcott’s firm subsequently used in promotional materials) were “well beneath the dignity of the legal profession.”

And you definitely don’t want to find yourself in the same situation that New York lawyer Lina Franco recently experienced. Franco, a labor and employment solo practitioner, was representing a group of restaurant workers in a wage-and-hour violations case in New Jersey federal court, *Ha v. Baengmart Café.* She missed a deadline to file a motion for certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 16 days after this motion was due, Franco filed a motion along with a request for an extension of time. As good cause for the extension, Franco represented to the court that she had missed her deadline due to a family emergency in Mexico City. She even attached what purported to be a travel website itinerary showing her flight from New York to Mexico City on Thursday, Nov. 21, 2016, and a Dec. 8, 2016, return flight. Unfortunately for Franco, her opposing counsel owned a calendar (Nov. 21 was a Monday, not a Thursday) and was social media savvy. Defense attorney Benjamin Xue responded with exhibits consisting of screenshots from Franco's own Instagram account. During the period of time she was supposedly in Mexico City caring for her ailing mother, Instagram photos posted by Franco herself showed her enjoying a Thanksgiving dinner in New York, visiting a bar in Miami, attending an art exhibit in Miami, and sitting poolside in Miami as well. (Note: Enjoying a poolside margarita does not count as “visiting Mexico.”)

Caught red-handed, Franco admitted her lack of candor to the court, saying she was “not honest” and claiming that she had experienced so much emotional distress from caring for her mother at an earlier juncture that it caused her to miss the filing deadline and provide the fake itinerary. Further falling on her sword, Franco withdrew as counsel for the three restaurant worker plaintiffs.

However, lawyers for the restaurant owners sought sanctions against Franco. U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael Hammer agreed with the defense, finding that Franco had “deliberately misled the court and the other attorneys in this case.” Judge Hammer imposed sanctions of $10,000 against Franco (a total of $44,283 in attorney’s fees were sought by the three defense firms, but Judge Hammer rejected the requests as “unreasonably high”).

Venturing online to discuss his cases led to disbarment for one veteran federal court practitioner. On Dec. 5, 2018, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered the disbarment of former federal prosecutor Salvador “Sal” Perricone for posting anonymous online comments about pending investigations and cases being handled by himself or the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The court found that Perricone’s “caustic, extrajudicial comments about pending cases strikes at the heart of the neutral dispassionate control which is the foundation of our system” and said its decision “must send a strong message ... to all members of the bar that a lawyer's ethical obligations are not diminished by the mask of anonymity provided by the internet.” Between November 2007 and March 2012, using online pseudonyms like “Henry L. Mencken 1951,” Perricone had posted more than 2,600 comments on nola.com (the website of the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*). These comments included references to a defense lawyer who had “screwed his client” in a case Perricone was prosecuting as well as commentary about the prosecution of New Orleans police officers in the Danziger Bridge shootings of six civilians (saying of the officers involved that “NONE of these guys should have ever been given a badge”).

It’s even possible for federal court practitioners to run afoul of social media when they’re merely observers in the courtroom. On Oct. 28, 2015, Vincent “Trace” Schmeltz, a partner at Barnes & Thornburg’s Chicago office, was observing the “spoofing” algorithms trial of accused futures trader Michael Coscia in U.S. District Judge Harry Leinenweber’s Chicago courtroom. While there, Schmeltz took photos of some of the evidence and sent at least nine tweets about them from his Twitter account, including such tweets as: “Prosecutor trying to impeach algo with this email. #HFT #cosciatrial,” and “Screenshot of ‘QuoteTrader,’ the allegedly spoofing algo used by Michael Coscia.” Schmeltz’s actions were spotted by an FBI special agent in the courtroom. Schmeltz didn’t notice the agent, or for that matter the large 4-foot-tall sign posted near the courtroom’s door that said “PHOTOGRAPHING, RECORDING OR BROADCASTING IS PROHIBITED.” Schmeltz was ordered to appear before U.S. District Court Judge Ruben Castillo for a show cause hearing to explain why he shouldn’t be sanctioned for violating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 as well as the court’s local rules banning photography and use of handheld devices in the courtroom. On Dec. 10, 2015,
Schmeltz was ordered to do 50 hours of pro bono work, donate $5,000 to the Chicago Bar Foundation, and attend a CLE class on ethics in social media.

**“But I Was Venting, Not Discussing Cases”: How Sharing Too Much on Social Media Can Get You in Trouble**

Your hands glide over the keyboard as you post a comment here, a “like” or a share there. Checking your Twitter feed, you scroll until something catches your interest and you decide to enter the online conversation with a tweet of your own, or maybe a retweet. Perhaps the topic du jour is something you’ve seen in the news. You do this in the shadow of that law license hanging on the wall, secure in the knowledge that you enjoy just as much First Amendment protection as anyone else does.

But as many lawyers (and even judges) are finding out nowadays, that doesn’t mean there won’t be consequences professionally. Just because you can air your innermost thoughts on Facebook or Twitter doesn’t mean you should, especially when one considers not just the potential backlash from the general public, but also from colleagues, clients, and even disciplinary authorities.

Consider some recent examples. In December 2017, Andrew Leonie, a top aide to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, wrote a Facebook post critical of the #MeToo movement, stating “Aren’t women is a ‘victim,’ so is every man. If everyone is a victim, no one is. Victim means nothing anymore.” He also linked to an article about how women purportedly “ask” to be objectified.16 The response from members of the public and the media was swift, condemning the remarks. The Texas Attorney General’s Office responded quickly as well. A spokeswoman for the office announced within several hours of the media reports that Leonie had resigned “effective immediately” and that the “views he expressed on social media do not reflect our values.”17

In September 2017, Austin, Texas, attorney Robert Ranco used his Twitter account to express his anger over Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos’ decision to revamp certain Obama administration Title IX guidelines on the investigation of on-campus sexual assault claims. Asserting that the move was “bad for young women,” he tweeted that he’d “be OK if #BetsyDeVos was sexually assaulted.”18 A firestorm quickly ensued, prompting Ranco to delete his Twitter account but not before acknowledging that his words “were harsh,” a “line that simple cannot be uncrossed.”23

In October 2017, a senior in-house lawyer at CBS posted insensitive comments on Facebook in the aftermath of the Las Vegas mass shooting, calling such establishments “utter cesspools of debauchery” and calling the city a “melting pot of Third World miscreants and thugs.” Lewis was terminated for violating his office’s social media policies.

Beyond negative publicity, loss of employment, and loss of clients, lawyers expressing themselves on social media can have ethical consequences as well. In November 2016, the District of Columbia Bar’s Legal Ethics Committee became the first in the country to address the risk of creating “positional” conflicts when blogging, posting, or tweeting about legal developments or even news.24 When a lawyer advances one position online, but is called upon to argue the opposite on a client’s behalf, a “positional” conflict exists. For example, a lawyer whose firm represents the National Rifle Association or a firearms manufacturer might be seen as having taken a position contrary to her client if she sent a tweet deploiring the proliferation of guns.

Another factor that lawyers need to consider before expressing what they feel online is whether the firm, company, or governmental agency they work for has a social media policy or internet usage policy covering such online statements. Such policies have become commonplace in light of digital age concerns about online sharing of confidential information or trade secrets, as well as the risk of an employer being viewed negatively thanks to its employee’s internet conduct. In 2016, Florida prosecutor Kenneth Lewis was fired after he posted controversial comments in the wake of the Orlando nightclub mass shooting, calling such establishments “utter cesspools of debauchery” and calling the city a “melting pot of Third World miscreants and thugs.” Lewis was terminated for violating his office’s social media policy, having received a warning over a previous post.25

So how can lawyers maintain their civility and avoid ethical issues when engaging on social media? Here are a few handy pointers:

1. **Treat social networking platforms no differently than other communications.** Lawyers run the risk of committing malpractice, violating disciplinary rules, and breaching ethical guidelines just as much when they post or tweet as when they write a letter. And in many ways, the permanence of something posted online and the seemingly unlimited audience it can reach make it vital for attorneys to be even more cautious about their Facebook posts or their tweets than they are with.
more traditional modes of communication. Make sure you understand the functionality of any social media site you use, including its privacy protocols. Bottom line: If you wouldn’t express it in a phone call, a letter, or a pleading filed with the court, don’t share it with the world on social media.

2. Remember the “eye of the beholder” before posting. Before posting something on social media, resist the immediacy, take a step back, and consider how it might be perceived—by opposing counsel, clients, the judge, and even the public. In July 2015, Pittsburgh-area Assistant District Attorney Julie Jones posted a photo on her Facebook page of herself holding a 12-gauge shotgun bearing an evidence tag, alongside a uniformed police officer brandishing an assault rifle (also evidence in the case). The photo bore the caption “You should take the plea.” While intended as humorous, the Facebook post didn’t amuse Jones’s superiors, who issued a statement calling her conduct “contrary to office protocol with respect to the handling of evidence.”

3. Don’t gloat. Countless football coaches, including Vince Lombardi, have reminded their players that if they make it into the end zone, “Act like you’ve been there before.” Wisconsin criminal defense attorney Anthony Cotton could have used this advice. Following the Sept. 18, 2015, acquittal of his client Brandon Burnside on homicide charges, Cotton took a “victory selfie” in the courtroom with Burnside and posted it on Facebook. The judge didn’t click “like,” and Cotton found himself back in court, apologizing and taking down the Facebook post.

Lawyers need to be mindful that they face heightened public and ethical scrutiny when they express opinions online or on social media, particularly in light of today’s more polarized climate. Lawyers also need to remember not only the speed with which our wired platforms, particularly in light of today’s more polarized climate. Law-ethical scrutiny when they express opinions online or on social media.

---

Endnotes


2. See, e.g., Connedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a lawyer’s failure to locate a sexual abuse victim’s recantation on her social media profile could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee Advisory Opinion No. 2012-13/05 (June 2013), http://www.nhbar.org/legal-links/Ethics-Opinion-2012-13_05.asp.


6. For a more detailed discussion, see John G. Browning, Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S L.J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 204 (2013).


8. See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025.


12. Id.


14. Id.


16. Id.


18. Id.

19. James Wilkinson, Texas Professor Resigns from Law Firm After Tweeting He’d Be “OK” With Betsy DeVos Being Sexually continued on page 73
registration of scandalous or immoral marks. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the provision was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Brunetti asks the Court to affirm the lower court’s invalidation of the provision because it amounts to viewpoint discrimination warranting strict scrutiny review, which the provision then fails. Andrei Iancu, the director of the USPTO, asks the Court to reverse the lower court decision because the scandalous marks provision is viewpoint neutral and does not impose an unconstitutional burden on speech. Iancu argues that the Court should instead apply the rational basis review standard and recognize that the provision serves legitimate government interests in protecting the moral sensibilities of all audiences as well as the orderly flow of commerce. The Court’s decision may have a chilling effect on free speech in commercial contexts and make it difficult for owners of marks deemed scandalous or immoral to reap commercial benefits from their marks.