\u00a0<\/p>\n
Second Circuit <\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n Natofsky v. City of New York<\/em><\/span><\/b>, <\/em>921 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. April 18, 2019)<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/i>The Court of Appeals holds for the first time that employment discrimination cases under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act follow the \u201cbut-for\u201d causation model, not \u201cmotivating factor.\u201d The Court also holds the plaintiff cannot survive defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on his claim. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On the causation standard, the Second Circuit applies the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning in Gross<\/i> and Nasser<\/i> in holding that when Congress prohibits discrimination \u201cbecause of\u201d the plaintiff\u2019s protected status (as opposed to explicitly stating that discrimination cannot be a \u201cmotivating factor,\u201d the \u201cbut-for\u201d causation test applies. <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 On the merits of the case, while plaintiff has a hearing disability and management treated him poorly by\u00a0 inter alia demanding that he speak more clearly and quickly and demoting him, he cannot prove discrimination because the evidence shows management was unhappy with his performance, reasoning, \u201cThere was ample evidence that Pogoda and Peters had reason to (and did) think that Natofsky\u2019s performance was deficient and demoted him on that basis. First, Pogoda noted in March 2014 her view that Natofsky was \u2018clueless.\u2019 Second, that same month, Natofsky failed to provide Peters with information regarding staffing and budgeting at the DOI, two areas under Natofsky\u02b9s purview. Third, there was a new administration in office that was restructuring the department in which Natofsky worked. Defendants presented evidence that other employees had been asked to leave or were transferred from their positions, including Natofsky\u02b9s immediate supervisor, Ulon. We conclude that \u2018construing the evidence in the light most favorable\u2019 to Natofsky and \u2018drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor,\u2019 no reasonable juror could conclude that Natofsky would have retained his position but for his disability.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp<\/span><\/i><\/b>., ___ F.3d ___, 2019 WL 105643 (2d Cir. March 6, 2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0After holding the Americans with Disabilities Act makes it illegal for an employer to maintain a hostile work environment on the basis of an employee\u2019s disability, the Court reinstates the claim brought by a disabled worker who was harassed because of his disability. Plaintiff has Tourette\u2019s Syndrome and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. As a result of his neurological condition, plaintiff would often touch the floor before moving, and he would cough when he felt a verbal tic coming on to prevent others from hearing him use foul language. But his coworkers mocked him over his disability. In his deposition, Fox described how certain Costco employees would make \u201chut\u2010hut\u2010hike\u201d remarks to mimic Fox\u2019s verbal and physical tics. Fox also testified that these comments \u201cwere audible to the managers of the Holbrook warehouse from their position on the warehouse\u2019s podium,\u201d and \u201chappened in plain view of the Supervisors and the Front End Managers and nothing was ever said.\u201d Fox testified further that these types of comments happened for \u201cmonths and months\u201d and \u201cwhenever\u201d he would experience tics. <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 On the scope of the ADA, the Court says that the ADA\u2019s language relating to \u201cterms, conditions and privileges\u201d of employment is identical to the protections under Title VII, which does prohibit a hostile work environment on the basis of race, sex, etc. Since the Supreme Court had already held that Title VII prohibits a hostile work environment when the ADA was enacted in 1990, we can assume that Congress intended the ADA to protect disabled workers from disability-related harassment. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have already interpreted the ADA this way.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 As for whether Fox has a hostile work environment claim, some managerial acts do not get him there, including certain discipline for not performing his duties properly, as \u201clegitimate reprimands by an employer are not abuse.\u201d But the jury may find that plaintiff suffered ongoing and pervasive harassment from coworkers who ridiculed his disability. While the district court in dismissing this claim said plaintiff had to introduce \u201cevidence regarding the number of times the comments were made per shift, week and\/or month\u201d to show that the \u201chut\u2010hut\u2010hike\u201d comments pervaded Fox\u2019s working environment. But that \u201cdemand[s] too much of Fox, the Court of Appeals says, because he \u201cis not required to list the shift, week, or month to be able to present this issue to a jury.\u201d Because Fox identified specific comments\u2014his co\u2010workers mocking his Tourette\u2019s by repeating \u201chut\u2010hut\u2010hike,\u201d presumably while touching the floor\u2014and because he testified that \u201cwhenever I said [the F word], they said \u2018hut\u2010hut\u2010hike\u2019\u201d for \u201cmonths and months,\u201d Fox has provided evidence sufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate pervasiveness. On Fox\u2019s evidence at this stage, we hold, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the \u201chut\u2010hut\u2010hike\u201d comments made for months by co\u2010workers when Fox experienced verbal tics were sufficiently severe and pervasive to change the conditions of Fox\u2019s employment.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 After finishing eight weeks in the classroom, plaintiff worked at the salon run by the school, performing cosmetology services for the public. He also had to perform janitorial and clerical work. Under state law, to offer cosmetology services in New York, students have to complete 1,000 hours of coursework in various subject areas, like hair styling. Plaintiff said the beauty school was the primary beneficiary of the relationship because it derived revenue from the work he performed for paying customers. He says that any training and skills he received from providing those services are \u201cbesides the point.\u201d The Second Circuit disagrees.<\/span> Submitted by:<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n Fourth Circuit<\/span><\/span><\/b> <\/i><\/p>\n <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc.<\/em><\/span><\/b>, <\/em>\u2013 F.3d \u2013 , 2019 WL 1768918 (4th Cir. April 23, 2019), available at http:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/172431.P.pdf<\/font><\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0A waste management company fired a black employee who had worked for the company for nine years.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee left before the start of his scheduled shift, after sending a text message to his supervisor saying that the employee was ill and could not work that day.\u00a0 <\/span>The supervisor consulted with other staff members who said that the employee left because he was frustrated that his truck was still under repair.\u00a0 <\/span>The company informed the employee that his employment was being terminated for job abandonment.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee filed a lawsuit against the company, alleging that he was terminated based on his race in violation of Title VII.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court entered summary judgment for the company, ruling that the employee failed to establish an appropriate comparator outside his protected class, and failed to produce evidence that the reason for termination was pretextual.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination in violation of Title VII under the McDonnell Douglas<\/i> framework, the employee must show that (1)\u00a0he was a member of a protected class; (2)\u00a0he was satisfactorily performing his job at the time his employment was terminated; (3) he was terminated from employment; and (4) the prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of other employees outside the protected class who received less severe discipline.\u00a0 <\/span>The burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee then must demonstrate that the proffered reason is pretextual.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s ruling that the employee failed to identify an appropriate comparator outside the protected class.\u00a0 <\/span>To establish a valid comparator, the employee must produce evidence that he and the comparator had the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer\u2019s treatment of them.\u00a0 <\/span>The employer argued that in addition to leaving before the start of his shift, the employee also had three prior infractions, including two minor driving incidents and use of a cell phone, although the employer had not previously cited those infractions as reasons for termination.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee argued that a white co-worker who had committed more serious infractions, yelled at his supervisor while quitting his job, and was allowed to return to work, was an appropriate comparator.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit agreed, emphasizing that a comparator need not have been involved in precisely the same conduct as the employee.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit also rejected the employer\u2019s argument, not addressed in the district court, that the employee failed to demonstrate that his performance was satisfactory.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit explained that the employee did not have to show that his performance was perfect, only that he was qualified for the job and that he was meeting his employer\u2019s legitimate expectations.\u00a0 <\/span>The employer argued that the employee violated company policy by notifying his supervisor of his illness by text message, but the record showed that the employee routinely communicated with his supervisor by text message.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee had also received performance bonuses and had recently been told that his performance was good.\u00a0 <\/span>Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the employee was performing satisfactorily at the time of termination.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>Finally, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court erred by determining that there was no evidence that the reason for termination was pretextual.\u00a0 <\/span>The Court cited prior cases allowing an inference of pretext when there is evidence that the employer has changed the proffered reason for termination over time.\u00a0 <\/span>Although the employer initially identified job abandonment as the only reason for termination, during the litigation the employer claimed that the employee\u2019s allegedly poor attitude was a reason for termination.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee also offered evidence that he did not engage in job abandonment, which the employer\u2019s own policies defined as missing work for three days without calling.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit found the inconsistencies in the employer\u2019s explanation for termination sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason for termination was pretextual.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/i><\/p>\n <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Spencer v. Virginia State University<\/span><\/i><\/b>, \u2013 F.3d \u2013, 2019 WL 1233046 (4th Cir. March 18, 2019), available at http:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/172453.P.pdf<\/font><\/a><\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0A sociology professor sued her university for violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, alleging that the university paid two male professors more than it paid her because she is a woman.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the university on both claims.\u00a0 <\/span>The professor appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>To establish a prima facie case for violation of the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employer paid higher wages to an employee of the opposite sex who (2) performed equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility (3) under similar working conditions.\u00a0 <\/span>This showing permits an inference that a pay disparity was based on sex discrimination, even without evidence of discriminatory intent.\u00a0 <\/span>The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>On the Equal Pay Act claim, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the professor failed to develop evidence that she performed work equal to that of her two proposed male comparators.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit concluded that the evidence could not support a finding that the comparators\u2019 work was equal to that of the professor\u2014both comparators were former university administrators who taught in different departments from the professor.\u00a0 <\/span>They taught more graduate courses than the professor, and worked more hours than she did.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit cautioned that an Equal Pay Act plaintiff cannot rely on high-level generalizations to show equal work; rather, she must offer evidence that the allegedly equal jobs required virtually identical work, skill, effort, and responsibility.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit concluded that even if the professor could make out a prima facie case, the university would still be entitled to summary judgment, because the undisputed facts showed that the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.\u00a0 <\/span>It was undisputed that the comparators\u2019 pay was based solely on their prior service as administrators, under the university\u2019s policy of paying administrators who return to teaching 75% of their administrative salary.\u00a0 <\/span>For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit also considered the employee\u2019s sex-based wage discrimination claim under Title VII.\u00a0 <\/span>Unlike the Equal Pay Act, Title VII requires a showing of intentional discrimination, through direct or circumstantial evidence, or through the McDonnell Douglas<\/i> burden-shifting framework.\u00a0 <\/span>To establish a prima facie case for wage discrimination under McDonnell Douglas<\/i>, the employee must show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) an adverse employment action occurred; and (4) the circumstances suggest a discriminatory motive.\u00a0 <\/span>When the prima facie case is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than men in similar jobs.\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cSimilar\u201d is a less stringent standard than \u201cequal\u201d; to evaluate whether jobs are similar, courts consider whether two employees had the same job description, were subject to the same standards, reported to the same supervisor, and had comparable qualifications.\u00a0 <\/span>If the employee makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the wage disparity.\u00a0 <\/span>The burden then shifts back to the employee to show that the explanation is merely pretextual.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit concluded that the employee failed to offer evidence that she and her proposed comparators held similar jobs.\u00a0 <\/span>Again, the Court criticized the employee\u2019s attempt to rely on generalizations, explaining that a plaintiff must offer evidence that the proposed comparators are similarly situated to the plaintiff in all respects.\u00a0 <\/span>Further, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the undisputed facts established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the comparators\u2019 higher pay\u2014the university\u2019s practice of paying 75% of the former administrative salary.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit found no evidence in the record that the explanation was a pretext for sex discrimination.\u00a0 <\/span>Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the university on the Title VII claim. Brundle v. Wilmington Trust, N.A.<\/span><\/i><\/b>, \u2013 F.3d \u2013, 2019 WL 1287632 (4th Cir. March 21, 2019), available at http:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/171873.P.pdf<\/font><\/a><\/span> <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n <\/i><\/p>\n \n<\/p> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The owners of a closely held corporation created and sold the company to an employee stock ownership plan (\u201cESOP\u201d).\u00a0 <\/span>An employee sued the ESOP\u2019s trustee, alleging that the trustee breached its fiduciary duties by overpaying for the company\u2019s stock, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (\u201cERISA\u201d).\u00a0 <\/span>Evidence presented at a bench trial showed that the owners, after twice trying and failing to sell the company, planned to sell the company to the ESOP in exchange for cash and a tax benefit.\u00a0 <\/span>The company engaged a trustee for the ESOP, and the trustee negotiated the stock purchase.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court found that the trustee breached its fiduciary duties, causing the ESOP to overpay for the stock, and awarded more than $29 million in damages.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court awarded attorneys\u2019 fees under ERISA\u2019s statutory fee-shifting provision, and under the equitable common fund doctrine.\u00a0 <\/span>The trustee appealed, and the employee cross-appealed the amount of the attorneys\u2019 fees.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit affirmed.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>ERISA generally prohibits a plan fiduciary from causing a sale or exchange of property between the plan and a party in interest.\u00a0 <\/span>29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1106(a)(1)(A).\u00a0 <\/span>Congress carved out an exception for ESOPs, which necessarily require the ESOP to purchase stock from the sponsoring employer, a party in interest.\u00a0 <\/span>To fall within the exception to the general prohibition on interested party transactions, an ESOP must pay no more than \u201cadequate consideration\u201d for the employer\u2019s stock.\u00a0 <\/span>Id.<\/i> \u00a7 1108(e)(1).\u00a0 <\/span>To determine whether there was adequate consideration only, courts focus on the conduct of the fiduciary, applying ERISA\u2019s prudent person standard.\u00a0 <\/span>An ESOP fiduciary must act solely in the interest of the participants, with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of a prudent person acting in a like capacity.\u00a0 <\/span>The plan fiduciary has the burden to show that the exception applies.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/i><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit rejected the trustee\u2019s arguments that the district court committed clear error in its fact findings underlying the conclusion that the trustee violated ERISA.\u00a0 <\/span>According to the district court\u2019s findings, the trustee hired a financial advisor, and relied on the financial advisor\u2019s report to determine the value of the company\u2019s stock.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court found four primary faults in the trustee\u2019s reliance on the advisor\u2019s report:\u00a0 <\/span>(1) the trustee did not investigate why the report omitted mention of a recent, much lower valuation of the company\u2019s stock; (2) the trustee failed to investigate financial projections underlying the valuation; (3) the report included a control premium for the stock, despite the fact that the company\u2019s owners would retain control; and (4) the advisor consistently rounded the valuation upward, in favor of the company, and to the detriment of the ESOP. \u00a0<\/i>The district court also found that the trustee, which had a lucrative business relationship with the financial advisor for the company, rushed to complete the stock purchase and met with the company\u2019s management only once.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit found no clear error in these findings, and affirmed the conclusion that the trustee failed act with the diligence required of a fiduciary.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>Next, the Fourth Circuit rejected the trustee\u2019s challenge to the damages award.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee presented expert testimony that the ESOP overpaid by more than $100 million.\u00a0 <\/span>Based on its independent analysis, the district court found that the ESOP overpaid by approximately $29 million.\u00a0 <\/span><\/i>The Fourth Circuit found no clear error in these findings.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit rejected the trustee\u2019s argument that the damages award should be reduced by a $20 million cash payment<\/a> the ESOP received when it sold the stock to another company.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit concluded that this late gain was irrelevant and did not change the fact that the ESOP had overpaid for the stock.\u00a0 <\/span>Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the damages award.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>Finally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the attorneys\u2019 fees award.\u00a0 <\/span>The district court awarded $1.8 million in statutory fees, and an additional $1.5 million payable out of the damages judgment based on the common fund doctrine.\u00a0 <\/span>The trustee argued that ERISA\u2019s statutory fee-shifting provision displaced the common fund doctrine, making it improper for the district court to award any fees under the common fund doctrine.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that ERISA\u2019s fee-shifting provision to not displace the common fund doctrine, while acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit has agreed with the trustee\u2019s position.\u00a0 <\/span>The employee argued that the district court erred by refusing to award the full one-third contingent fee in the employee\u2019s engagement agreement with counsel.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the employee could not bind the ESOP participants to an engagement agreement and noting that many of the participants objected to the contingent fee.\u00a0 <\/span>The Fourth Circuit found no clear error in the amount of the district court\u2019s award under the common fund doctrine.<\/span><\/p>\n Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc.<\/span><\/i><\/b>, 915 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. February 8, 2019), available at http:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/181206.P.pdf<\/font><\/a><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
<\/strong>
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Intern who obtained educational experience at a cosmetology school was not entitled to salary under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under <\/span>Glatt v. Searchlight Pictures<\/span><\/i>, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015), the intern is not entitled to any compensation under the FLSA the intern is the \u201cprimary beneficiary\u201d of the relationship. If the intern\u2019s employer is the \u201cprimary beneficiary\u201d of the relationship, then the entity is an employer under the FLSA and the intern has to receive compensation.<\/span><\/span><\/velarde><\/span><\/p>\n
\nStephen Bergstein, Esq.
<\/span>Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP
<\/span>5 Paradies Lane
<\/span>New Paltz, New York 12561
<\/span>(845) 419-2250<\/span><\/p>\n
<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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